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Abstract
Why do so many African governments adopt predatory policies towards the private
sector, when pro-growth reforms might yield greater tax revenues as well as higher
national income?  In this paper we first use a growth regression which, controlling for the
factors identified in previous studies, identifies taxation of primary exports and
investment in agricultural R&D as independently significant correlates of economywide
growth.  We then posit a game-theoretic political economy model in which the
government sets these two policy instruments in strategic interaction with domestic
producers.  We find significant evidence that some African policymakers could be
trapped in a low-growth equilibrium, which they can break only when changes in game
structure (and hence institutions such as political parties) allow them to make credible
commitments to pro-growth, low-tax/high-investment strategies.
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Growth and Policy in Africa:
A strategic-interaction model of predatory regimes
I.  Introduction
Is Africa destined to grow more slowly than other regions of the world for
immutable reasons, or can reforms help the region converge to the real income levels
enjoyed elsewhere?  And if convergence were feasible, what factors could explain the
persistence of policies that inhibit growth?  This paper contributes to the literature on
growth in Africa through an econometric model of conditional convergence, linked to a
game-theoretic model of policy choice.  Our objective is to use variability within Africa
to identify factors that have helped Africa’s better performers succeed, in hopes of
explaining the persistence of slow growth elsewhere and informing the design of
successful reforms.
During the 25 years since Independence, much of Africa has experienced a
substantial decline in living standards – but during the same period a dozen African
countries saw sustained growth.  Using a new panel data set we show that two types of
policy—taxation of primary exports and spending on agricultural research—account for a
significant fraction of the cross-country variation in economic growth, controlling for the
factors already identified by the work of Sachs and Warner (1997) or Easterly and Levine
(1997). Our game-theory model then attempts to explain these policy choices in terms of
structural factors. Empirical tests support the model.  Although much variation in policy
remains unexplained, our approach highlights the role of structural conditions that
influence policy choice, and helps specify the changes needed to sustain policy reform
and thereby accelerate growth.
II.  Theories of Economic Growth and Policy Choice
To explain economic growth we adopt a conditional-convergence model, based
on the pioneering work of Abramovitz (1986), Baumol (1986), DeLong (1988), and
Barro (1991, 1992).  This literature is formalized in Barro and Xala-I-Martin (1995:88),Growth and Policy in Africa p. 2
and our application to Africa builds on Savvides (1995), Sachs and Warner (1997),
Easterly and Levine (1997) and Temple (1998).  A central conclusion of this literature is
that adopting growth-oriented policies might allow African countries, like other low-
income nations, to converge on the income levels of wealthier regions. But what explains
the persistence of growth-inhibiting policies?  To explain policy choice we construct a
repeated-game model designed to identify those conditions under which a government
could not credibly commit itself to pro-growth policy, so that successive political regimes
remain in a low-growth equilibrium with predatory policies and limited private
investment or productivity growth.  Breaking out of this equilibrium would require
structural changes in political institutions, including for example the creation of long-
lived political parties whose members discipline one another in pursuit of a collective
commitment to growth.
Economic Growth
In the Barro (1991) framework used by Sachs and Warner (1997), economic
growth is a transitional process in which countries are adjusting gradually from current
per-capita income to their steady-state level of per-capita income. The production
function is Cobb-Douglas, and in the neighborhood of the steady state, the time path of
the log of per capita income is given by




According to this equation, the log of real GDP is equal to y(0) at time 0 and, if b<0, y
ss
in the limit as t approaches infinity. In between, output is on a path that is concave with
respect to time, that is, growth will be fast at first and then will slow down as real GDP
approaches the steady state. Growth will also be faster the larger is the initial income gap
y
ss-y(0). In the cross-country empirical implementation of (1), y
ss may be thought of not
as a constant value to which the economy is converging, but as a variable with its own
trend growth rate.
  Equation (1) embodies the idea that the transition from current GDP to potential
GDP (or the potential GDP trend line) takes time.  Empirical estimates of b, theGrowth and Policy in Africa p. 3
convergence parameter governing the speed of adjustment, typically find that at least 15
years are needed to cut the income gap in half.  But convergence rates are not necessarily
uniform across countries: they are conditional on the country’s own potential GDP level
(or growth rate).  Here the growth-regression literature turns to the general framework of
the Solow growth model, in which steady state output per worker is a function of the
national savings rate and the level of total factor productivity or efficiency.  In a standard
Solow model, savings are assumed to be a fixed fraction of output, so income converges
to a constant output per unit of efficiency-adjusted labor.  Any growth in steady-state
income is due to technical change.
The universe of variables that potentially affect steady-state growth has been
surveyed by Xala-I-Martin (1997).  In regressions on a worldwide sample of over 80
countries including 24 in Africa, Sachs and Warner (1997) identify seven variables of
empirical significance. Two of these variables are immutable parameters of geographic
location (tropical climate and landlockedness), two have both geographic and policy
influences (life expectancy and natural resource dependence), and three represent the
outcome of many government policies (openness, institutional quality, and government
savings).  Temple (1998) provides further empirical tests combining these variables with
those of Easterly and Levine (1997) and others, finding the general results to be robust to
outlier exclusion and specification tests.
For this paper we look within Africa and extend previous work to consider two
very specific policy choices, so as to be able to link the economic-growth model to a
political-economy model of government behavior.  Our central hypothesis is that a major
determinant of African growth has been governments’ taxation of primary exports and
investment in R&D for agriculture, which are key sources of economic rents and
productivity growth in these very capital-scarce countries.  The importance of these two
variables for economy-wide growth, and the degree to which so many African
governments pursued tragically self-destructive policies, sets up our next task: to
construct a model that links policy choices to observable features of African economies,
so as to assess Africa’s future prospects for reform and growth.Growth and Policy in Africa p. 4
Policy Choice
Figure 1 (on the last page) summarizes the sequence of decisions in a repeated-
game model of interactions between government and farmers, in which government
chooses how much to tax primary exports and invest in agricultural R&D, while farmers
decide how much to produce.  The model builds on Gilbert and Newbery (1994) and
related work by Besley (1992).  In this formulation, the game lasts two periods in order to
capture the idea that payoffs to R&D spending are delayed. The game proceeds as
follows. In period t, the government moves first and announces a support price and how
much it will invest in R&D. Farmers then decide whether to plant and if they plant,
whether to harvest. The government then pays farmers which in turn determines whether
farmers harvest. In period t+1, the game continues if and only if farmers receive a price in
period t that is equal to or greater than their total costs of production. The game in period
t+1 is identical to the game in period t except that output is now increased by an amount
equal to g because R&D has increased productivity. If the game lasts only two periods,
there is a unique equilibrium at the strategies and payoffs (10) which consists of zero
planting and no spending on R&D: producers expect the government to act
opportunistically, so any investment would be lost.
Once the game is repeated, an infinite number of equilibria are possible. Our
concern is to identify the circumstances leading to a pro-growth equilibrium with sustained
planting and spending on R&D, assuming that if this is not sustainable players revert to the
unique Nash equilbrium of the two period game. For a pro-growth policy to be sustainable,
the cost of predatory actions must be greater than their benefits.  We must therefore specify
what happens when the government does act opportunistically: here we assume that if the
government covers only harvesting costs and does not invest in R&D for any one period,
farmers revert to the subsistence-farming equilibrium for k periods. Whether this cost is
enough to stop the government from acting opportunistically depends on how heavily the
government discounts future earnings.Growth and Policy in Africa p. 5
Table 1.  Payoffs associated with alternative strategies
————————————————————————————————————
Strategy Government  Farmers
(1) (P
w - (s+h))*1 - rd + b[(P
w-(s+h))(1+g) - rd] 0
(2) (P
w - (s+h))*1 - rd + b[(P
w-h)(1+g)- as - rd] -d(1+g) s
(3) (P
w - (s+h))*1 - rd + b[(P
w-(s+h))(1+g) ]  0
(4) (P
w - (s+h))*1 - rd + b[(P
w-h)(1+g)- as] -d(1+g) s
(5) (P
w - h)*1 - as -rd -s
(6) (P
w - (s+h))*1 + b[(P
w-(s+h)) - rd]  0
(7) (P
w - (s+h))*1 + b[(P
w-h) - as - rd] -d(1+g) s
(8) (P
w - (s+h))*1 + b[(P
w-(s+h)) ] 0
(9) (P
w - (s+h))*1 + b[(P
w-h) - as] -d(1+g) s
(10) (P
w - h)*1 - as  -s
————————————————————————————————————
Note: Strategy numbers refer to the decision tree in Figure 1.
In the infinitely repeated game, the payoffs associated with a low-tax policy and
continued spending on R&D are the following:
Payoffs from deviating, assuming k periods of “punishment”, are,
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The parameter b represents the government’s one-period discount factor, s are sunk costs, h
are harvesting costs P
w
t is the world price at time t, rd is spending on research and
development and g is the increase in output associated with R&D.  Subtracting equation (3)
from equation (2) gives the conditions under which the high-growth outcome is sustainable,
with continued low taxes, efficient production and continued investment in R&D.  To
simplify the final expression, we assume that Et Pt+k
w  is the same for all periods, and that k
is infinitely long.  This yields the following condition for governments to choose the high-
growth strategy:
(4) STC (1-a) < d (k) [(EPROF -1)(1+g
e) - rd/(s+h)].
The left-hand side of inequality (4) is the ratio of sunk costs to total costs and
represents the short-run gain from acting opportunistically. The right hand side of inequality
(4) is the present discounted cost of doing so. With an infinitely long k, farmers taxed by an
opportunistic government are expected to retreat from the market forever, so the government
loses the present discounted value of all future tax revenue.  Equation (4) allows us to test
the theory empirically, as each of its variables has an implication for the level of taxation
and investment in R&D.  They are discussed in turn below.
Ratio of Sunk Costs to Total Costs (STC)
The set of parameters for which the first-best policy is sustainable is greater the greater the
ratio of harvesting costs to total costs or, the lower the ratio of sunk costs to total costs (the
left hand side of the inequality). When harvesting costs are high, the government's
opportunities for short-run gain decrease because in any one period, the government must
pay at least harvesting costs to get any output at all. The lower the harvesting costs and
hence the greater the proportion of sunk costs in total costs, the greater the potential gain
from underpaying farmers.Growth and Policy in Africa p. 7
Discount Factor (d (k))
The set of parameters for which the first-best policy is sustainable is greater the more the
government values future revenue. Thus, deviations from the first-best policy are less likely
the closer the discount factor is to one. Again, the discount factor is a measure of the weight
the government places on future revenue relative to revenue earned today. Usually, the
discount factor is interpreted as one over one plus the interest rate and represents the time
value of money. This interpretation is narrow, however, and leaves little room for variation
of the discount factor from government to government, and the role of political institutions
in imposing collective discipline.  For our empirical work we will use the government’s
probability of remaining in power, to measure just one major influence on its discount rate.
Expected Future Profits (EPROF
 )
The set of parameters for which the first-best policy is sustainable is greater the greater the
future expected world price. This is because deviations today imply a greater loss in future
export earnings when world prices tomorrow are expected to be high.  Expectations may be
formed in various ways; for our empirical work we use a simple average of past profits.
Weight on Producer Surplus (a)
The set of parameters for which the first-best policy is sustainable is greater the greater is
a ,  the weight the government places on producer surplus. The greater a is, the more the
government cares about farmers and hence the lower the value it places on “stolen” revenue.
Since we have no empirical counterpart to this variable, we leave it unobserved.
Net Benefit of R&D [d (k) (g
e - rd/(s+h))]
The set of parameters for which the first-best policy is sustainable is greater the greater is the
expected productivity increase due to R&D spending,  g
e . This is because the government
has more to lose in the future by heavily taxing today and not investing in R&D the greater
is g
e.  On the other hand, the set of parameters for which the first-best policy is sustainable is
greater the lower the cost of R&D relative to total costs.  The greater rd/(s+h), the less the
government has to lose in the future by heavily taxing today and not investing in R&D.  TheGrowth and Policy in Africa p. 8
important point here is that the benefits of R&D spending are delayed and hence, although
spending on R&D could provide the government with more revenue and society with
greater welfare in the long run, R&D policy is subject to a time consistency problem.
III.  Data and Results
The data used to estimate the growth equations and test our political-economy model
come from several sources.  First, we replicate the work of  Sachs and Warner (1997) using
their data.  Then, we identify the key role of policy choices in explaining intra-African
variation using data on primary-export taxation from Deaton and Miller (1995) and Jaeger
(1992), plus data on R&D investments from Pardey, Alston and Rosenboom (1998).  Finally
we test the policy-choice model using data on the structure of production costs from Martin
(1991).  Complete documentation of the data sources, along with some additional results not
reported here, are provided in McMillan (1998).
Can Agricultural Policy Explain Growth?
The regression results presented in Table 1, Column 1, show that five of the nine
variables used by Sachs and Warner to explain sources of slow growth in Africa relative to
the rest of the world do a poor job of explaining growth within Africa.  Two of the key
Sachs-Warner variables, tropical climate and open trade regime, have very little variance in
the African subsample: out of 23 countries, 20 are entirely tropical and 17 are classified as
completely closed. Three other Sachs-Warner variables, landlockedness, natural-resource
exports, and institutional quality, also lose their significance in a within-Africa regression.
Column 2 of Table 1 presents estimates with the same data when the insignificant
variables are dropped, showing that the variables providing robust explanation of growth
within Africa are initial income, life expectancy, government savings and relative growth in
the economically active population.  Initial income captures the idea of conditional
convergence, consistent with diminishing marginal returns on reproducible capital.  Life
expectancy captures the impact of health and human capital on both total savings and total
factor productivity.  Government savings affect growth through the total savings rate, andGrowth and Policy in Africa p. 9
perhaps also through the efficiency of investment.  Relative growth in the economically
active population affects growth via the dependency ratio and its influence on total factor
productivity.
For Column 3 of Table 1, we use the same data but expand the sample size to all 32
African countries for which the five retained variables are available.  Expanding the sample
slightly raises the coefficient and significance of life expectancy, and slightly lowers the
coefficient without changing the significance of growth in economically active population,
but otherwise has little effect on the regression results.
Columns 4-9 present results from regressions that include taxation of primary
exports, and the regressions in columns 7-9 include investment in agricultural R&D as well.
Each variable is tested with three equations, corresponding to three different measures of
taxation. Columns 4-5 and 7-8 use a dummy variable constructed by Deaton and Miller
(1995) to indicate whether a country pays producers a relatively low proportion of the world
price, for a weighted average of the country’s most important exports.  Columns 4 and 7 use
the Deaton and Miller dummy for the period 1970-1975, while columns 5 and 8 use a
similar variable for the period 1970-1979.  Finally, columns 6 and 9 use a continuous
measure, the nominal protection coefficient (NPC), or ratio of domestic producer prices to
world prices.  Note that the signs of the two types of measures are reversed: a positive
dummy indicates more taxation, whereas a larger NPC indicates less taxation.
The effect of taxation is significant in all but one of the six regressions.  The
magnitude of effect is quite large: moving between the low-tax and high-tax categories is
associated with a change of about one percent in annual real GDP growth, and changing the
NPC of 0.1 is associated with a change in the growth rate of 0.2 percent per year.
Furthermore, the effect of taxation on growth is largely independent of the other variables’
explanatory power, as their estimated coefficients and significance are little affected.Growth and Policy in Africa p. 10
Table 1.  Results of Growth Regressions
Dependent variable: Growth of per capita PPP-adjusted GDP, 1965-90
Explanatory
Variables                       (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6)         (7)         (8)         (9)
Initial -1.76 -1.19 -1.39 -1.47 -1.48 -1.53 -2.24 -2.02 -2.12







Life Expectancy .13 .11 .15 .16 .14 .13 .15 .14 .16
(2.74) (2.13) (3.97) (4.37) (3.68) (2.31) (3.66) (4.08) (2.31)
Government .21 .21 .18 .17 .18 .18 .09 .14 .26







Growth in e.a. 4.2 2.73 2.03 1.28 1.82 2.21 2.06 2.28 3.28
population (3.23) (2.39) (2.36) (2.09) (2.34) (1.47) (2.61) (2.72) (2.09)
Taxation -1.03 -.73 2.34 -1.01 -.86 1.96
(3.19) (1.96) (2.43) (2.92) (1.86) (0.66)
R&D  0.21  0.11 0.08
(2.51) (1.34) (.12)
Adjusted R
2 .87 .81 .76 .84 .81 .69 .95 .93 .91
No. of Countries 23 23 32 32 32 24 17 17 11
_________________________________________________________________________
Note:  Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.Growth and Policy in Africa p. 11
Columns 7-9 of Table 1 test for the correlation between agricultural R&D spending
and growth, using data on total expenditure from Pardey, Alston and Roseboom (1998),
expressed as a percentage of agricultural GDP for the period 1961-1991.  The three columns
differ only in the measure of taxation used.  Including both R&D and taxation in the same
equation causes the t-statistics to differ according to the measure of taxation used, perhaps
due to differences in the degree of collinearity between R&D and different measures of
taxation.  The strongest result is obtained under specification 7, using Deaton and Miller's
measure of taxation for the 1970-75 period only.  The estimated parameter is large and
significant: it implies that increasing the share of agricultural GDP re-invested in agricultural
R&D by one percent (from 3 to 4 percent, for example) is associated with a rise in annual
per-capita GDP growth of over 0.2 percent (e.g. from 3 to 3.2 percent per year).
Can economic structure explain policy choice?
We have seen that primary-export taxation and agricultural R&D are strong
determinants of growth. This is interesting but unless we also understand what determines
policy choice, we still won't know what institutional changes could influence policies and
hence increase economic growth.  In this section we test our repeated-game model of the
interaction between government and farmers.  The model predicts that three structural
factors, the variables STC, d(k) and EPROF, will help explain policy outcomes.  Table 2
presents regression results estimating the strength of the correlations between those variables
and four measures of policy choice:  Taxdum1 (the Deaton and Miller measure for
individual crops), Taxdum2 (the same measure aggregated to the country level), NPC  (the
continuous measure of taxation), and R&D intensity (which matters in itself, and may also
be correlated with unobserved other features of good governments).
Columns 1 and 3 present the results of crop-specific regressions, with a sample size
of 128 crops and countries.  By far the largest and most significant coefficient is on the STC
variable, which is of the expected sign and is of surprisingly large magnitude:  a one-unit
change in the level of STC is associated with a five percent increase in the probability of
adopting predatory policies towards that crop. Changes in the d(k) variable are also
significant, and also have a relatively large magnitude:  a one-unit change in  d(k) is
associated with a 0.1-unit change in the probability that government will adopt predatoryGrowth and Policy in Africa p. 12
policies.  The level of EPROF is not significant in these regressions, perhaps because it is
very poorly measured as we use average historical profitability to proxy expected future
profits.
To explain R&D intensity, which we observe at the country level and not for
individual crops, we must turn to a country-level regression with a smaller sample size.
Results are shown in column 4, and for comparison we present a similar regression to
explain taxation levels in column 2.  Since each crop has different structural characteristics
(STCs and EPROF), we construct an aggregate measure for each country of the incentives
for government to commit to a pro-growth strategy, and forego predatory policies.  This
commit index is calculated as the following weighted average over all crops (j) in each
country (i):
A higher level of commit corresponds to larger relative benefits of sustaining the pro-growth
policy package, so we hypothesize that it will be correlated with lower taxation and higher
R&D intensity.  In our empirical test, regression coefficients are indeed of the expected sign,
and significantly so.  The adjusted R
2 is under 10 percent, indicating that the commit index
explains a relatively small fraction of the variance in taxation or R&D intensity, with even
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Table 2.  Determinants of Tax Regime and R&D Spending for Agriculture
Dependent variables
                                       Taxdum1          Taxdum2          NPC                  R&D                 









commit -.51 -.41 .13 .13
(3.73) (2.01) (2.55) (2.59)
likelihood ratio 33.2 16.91 4.28
adjusted R
2 .23 .05 .17 .09
No. Observations 128 128 32 128 128 64 64
_____________________________________________________________________
absolute t-statistics in parenthesesGrowth and Policy in Africa p. 14
IV.  Conclusion
This paper presents a model of policy choice aimed at explaining why so many
African governments adopt self-defeating predatory policies towards the private sector,
when pro-growth reforms would yield greater incomes for both government and the private
sector.
First we adapt a standard growth-regression model to demonstrate that two kinds of
policy, taxation of primary exports and investment in agricultural R&D, significantly
explain economywide growth.   Then we derive a political-economy model in which the
government sets the level of these two policy instruments in a strategic game with domestic
producers.  One equilibrium has the government commit to low taxes with investment in
R&D, so as to elicit high levels of production and economic growth.  Another possible
equilibrium involves high tax rates and no investment, to which the economy responds with
low production and economic growth.
In a repeated game, the government can credibly commit to the high-growth strategy
only under certain conditions.  We derive an equation linking policy choice to potentially
observable characteristics of the sector, notably the share of sunk costs in total costs (and
hence the potential payoff to exploitation by a rent-seeking government), the government’s
discount rate and the product’s expected future profitability (and hence the cost of
opportunistically exploiting producers, who would then withdraw from the market).  Our
empirical test finds considerable support for the model.  Our preliminary conclusion is that
African countries have been trapped in a low-growth equilibrium of opportunistic policies
and low investment, so that reforms enabling governments to make credible pro-growth
commitments are likely to have a high payoff.Growth and Policy in Africa p. 15
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